Time: 2019 Nov 1, 13:30-16:00
Venue: 蒙民伟科技大楼南楼S527, Tsinghua Univ.
Speaker: Dr Yang Liu (University of Cambridge)
In this talk I will discuss some surprises and puzzles in epistemic models. First, I will show a generalisation of Aumann’s surprising impossibility result in the context of rational decision making. I will then move, in the second part, to discuss the interpretational meaning of some formal setups of epistemic models, and I will do so by means of presenting an interesting puzzle in epistemic logic. The aim is to highlight certain problematic aspects of these epistemic systems concerning first/third-person asymmetry which underlies both parts of the story. This asymmetry, I argue, reveals certain limits of what epistemic models can be.
刘 洋 ( www.yliu.net)
Leverhulme Research Fellow & Isaac Newton Fellow
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge