

## Schedule, titles and abstracts for

### [workshop] Logic, Modernity, Modernism: Chinese and European Perspectives

#### Saturday, October 11

09.00 - 09.30: Coffee

09.30 - 10.00: Welcome (by Wang Lu, Tsinghua University) and Opening of the workshop (by Wan Junren, dean of the School for Humanities, Tsinghua University)

10.00 - 11.00: Bob Hale (University of Sheffield) *Essence*

11.00 - 12.00: Chen Jiaming (Xiamen University) *Chinese Practice Epistemology: from the Perspective of Knowledge-How*

12.00 - 13.30: lunch

13.30 - 14.30: Dimitris Gakis (University of Amsterdam) *Wittgenstein, Modernism, and Modernity: Some Contextual and Systematic Remarks*

14.30 - 15.30: Han Linhe (Peking University) *Man is a Rule-Following Animal*

15.30 - 16.00: break

16.00 - 17.00: Gavin Kitching (University of New South Wales) *The Wittgensteinian Critique of Scientism*

17.00 - 18.00: Discussion (moderated by Wang Lu)

19.00: Dinner

#### Sunday, October 12

09.30 - 10.00: Coffee

10.00 - 11.00: Chen Yajun (Nanjing University) *Pragmatism in China and Chinese Philosophy*

11.00 - 12.00: Sandra Lapointe (McMaster University) *Kant, Logic and the Analytical Tradition*

12.00 - 13.30: lunch

13.30 - 14.30: Yu Junwei (Renmin University) *Modality from the Perspective of Conception*

14.30 - 15.30: Marin Stokhof (University of Amsterdam) *What Cost Naturalism?*

15.30 - 16.00: break

16.00 - 17.00: Wang Lu (Tsinghua University) *Frege for China*

17.00 - 18.00: Closing discussion (moderated by Martin Stokhof)

19.00: Dinner

#### Chen Jiaming - Xiamen University

##### Chinese Practice Epistemology: from the Perspective of Knowledge-How

The paper is going to expound on the following issues. First, to interpret the ideas of "knowledge" in traditional Chinese philosophy, including that "knowledge" as the efforts of intellectual and moral introspection, "knowing" is oriented toward the moral principles, and the result of Knowledge is to achieve the "unity of knowledge and action," as well as to realise moral practice.

Second, opposing to the idea that “epistemology has never occurred in China”, to explain, borrowing Gilbert Ryle’s notion of knowledge-how, why Chinese epistemology should be understood as a “practice epistemology”.

Third, to compare the Chinese “practice epistemology” with the Ryle’s theory of knowledge-how, and pointing out that Chinese practice epistemology has something similar to Ryle’s descriptions, such as both of them are related to people’s ability and performance; but at the same time, it also has its own unique characteristics, such as takes “knowledge-how” as a whole which consists of the unity of knowledge and action, etc.

**Chen Yajun - Nanjing University**

### **Pragmatism in China and Chinese Philosophy**

First we sketch a short history of pragmatism in China. The first stage (around 1919): started with Dewey visiting China; in this stage pragmatism was mainly methodology. At the second stage (around mid-1950s) pragmatism became centred around a subjective theory of truth. And at the third stage (1980s – today) pragmatism was associated with a positivist theory of meaning. In general, we argue, in China pragmatism has been classified as either a kind of quasi-scientism or subjectivism

Then we turn to radical empiricism, and argue that it presents a new worldview, different from that of traditional western philosophy, in which the empirical world was equated with the world that common people never doubt in their everyday lives, but that is in fact just a shadow of reality, or merely a subjective phenomenon. I.e., here there is a gap between experience and the real world. Pragmatism, we argue, challenges the western dualism, and a pragmatist radical empiricism equals a descriptive metaphysics: radical experience is experience of what really is. In Dewey primary experience is the interaction between human being and her environment, i.e., a doing, and has an intentional character, through which objects are established and thereby acquire their significance. The old ontological dichotomies, e.g., subject/object, fact/value, reason/emotion, are now regarded as functional distinctions, i.e., distinctions made in specific contexts

Thirdly we go into the significance of this interpretation of pragmatism. We show that previous interpretations, that classify pragmatism as scientism, are inadequate, and also that the new pragmatism proposed by Rorty deviates from the core concern of pragmatism. Of special importance is that this interpretation provides a platform for a dialogue between pragmatism and Chinese philosophy. We will show that there are many similarities, e.g., both take as the starting-point of philosophy direct experiences, and not cognitive concerns. Also, both lack a transcendental dimension, (here we argue that Dao is not a transcendental principle), and lack ontological dichotomies (subject/object, fact/value, reason/emotion, etc.). In both there is an emphasis on unity of knowledge and action. Finally we also note some differences, such as the respective attitudes toward language, and the connotations that the term “practice” has in both traditions.

**Dimitris Gakis - University of Amsterdam**

**Wittgenstein, Modernism, and Modernity: Some Contextual and Systematic Remarks**

In the first and main part of my talk I will first try to clarify the notions of 'modernism' and 'modernity' and then discuss, from both a contextual and a systematic point of view, the various connections that can be drawn between Wittgenstein's (early) life and thought, modernism, and modernity. I will focus on some features of modernism, like self-referentiality, constructivism, and the (immanent) critique of modernity, and on characteristics of modernity, like scientism, essentialism, and dogmatism, which are also shared by various modernist endeavours, and take a closer look at their manifestations in Wittgenstein's early writings. Through the investigation of different aspects of the intricate interface between modernity, various forms of modernism, and *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein's early enterprise emerges as an exemplar of a work in which modernism and modernity, in spite of their often-opposing tendencies, converge.

In the second part of my talk I will try, as a stimulus for further discussion, to expand the discussion of the first part by briefly treating two questions that touch upon the broader theme of the workshop. The first question is whether the discussion of Wittgenstein's case may also inform the discussion of the relation of logic and (early) analytic philosophy in general to modernism and modernity. I will try to sketch a possible answer to this question by highlighting the distinctive position that *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* occupies in the history of logic and analytic philosophy. The second question is whether the (philosophical) discussion of Wittgenstein's case may contribute to a discussion of modernism and modernity that does not focus exclusively on their philosophical aspects, but approaches them and their features as constitutive characteristics of the modern human form(s) of life. The answer to this question will be based on Wittgenstein's views on the relation between philosophy and everyday life and on the affinities between later Wittgenstein's views (and his later deep critique of modernity) and certain aspects of the humanist-Marxist tradition and the post-Marxist thought.

**Bob Hale - University of Sheffield**

**Essence**

A striking feature of the development of logic in late 19th and early 20th century Europe is that it largely excluded any serious discussion of modality, and accorded no significant role in logical theory to modal notions. Neither Frege nor Russell showed any interest in necessity (even logical necessity), and in spite of the work of C.I.Lewis and later Ruth Barcan Marcus, modal logic remained a beleaguered minority interest, under a cloud of suspicion largely disseminated by W.V.Quine. As for any form of essentialism, nearly everyone (with the notable exception of Barcan Marcus) regarded it as belonging to the dark ages, and best left there. Things changed somewhat with the development of

model-theoretic semantics for modal logics in the late 1950s, and rather more as a result of the dissemination, a decade or so later, of Kripke's more philosophical contribution in his lectures on Naming and Necessity. But the former -- possible world semantics -- was attractive to many, such as David Lewis, precisely because it seemed to offer a reductive explanation of problematic modal notions in non-modal terms. In spite of Kripke's work, which persuaded many of the existence and importance of a metaphysical kind of necessity and possibility, others have continued to be sceptical about de re modalities, and a fortiori, about essentialism. But in the last few decades, as a result of work by Kit Fine and others, there has been a new defence of essentialist ideas, and the development of an essentialist theory (or perhaps theories) of modality. In this talk, I shall survey some of the main features and cruxes in this complex historical development, and especially its later stages. I shall make no attempt to hide my own sympathies, which are firmly with a view which sees modal notions as essential and irreducible, and modal facts as best understood in terms of an essentialist theory of necessity and possibility.

**Han Linhe - Peking University**

#### **Man is a Rule-Following Animal**

One of the most famous and fundamental propositions made by Aristotle is the claim that by its nature the human being is an animal that possesses reason, i.e., a rational animal. How should we expand on this claim? Kant's conceptions of reason suggests a way to do this. According to him, the understanding is the faculty of rules, and reason in the narrow sense he gives it the faculty of principles. Following this understanding of reason (which in its usual sense includes both understanding and reason in Kant's sense), we might just as well rephrase Aristotle's definition of man this way: rule-following animals. The present paper is to expand on this point with the help of Wittgenstein's insights about rule-following.

**Gavin Kitching - University of New South Wales**

#### **The Wittgensteinian Critique of Scientism**

The critique of scientism has a rather curious status, both in Wittgenstein's own work (where it emerges explicitly only in what may be regarded as philosophically marginal texts - above all Culture and Value) and in the commentary literature, where it is absolutely central to some scholars (most notably of course those influenced by Peter Winch's *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy*) and more or less ignored by others (Bloor, Rubinstein, Habermas) at least in the sense that they see Wittgensteinian philosophy as a positive resource for the creation of a 'critical social science'.

I will argue in my paper that Wittgenstein's later philosophy embodies, at its heart, a conception of what it is for human beings to understand one another that has profoundly destructive implications for all conceptions of a 'science of society', although it is not incompatible with what might be called the scholarly study of human beings and their

interactions. I will attempt to specify both the possibilities and limitations of such 'study' with specific reference to economics and politics.

**Sandra Lapointe - McMaster University**  
**Kant, Logic and the Analytical Tradition**

While they disagree on a range of issues, most recent contributions to the history of analytical philosophy resort to the idea that we stand in fiduciary relations and share intellectual commitments with analytical philosophers of the past, that analytical philosophy today is the outcome of a "tradition". By contrast to what is the case in other subfields of the history of philosophy such traditionalist assumptions are not idle. They are involved in determining the object and scope of historical investigations, generating substantial disagreement concerning periodisation and relevance. This largely programmatic paper has three parts. In the first part, I explain what I take the traditionalist approach to the history of analytical philosophy to be and point to some problems. In the second part of the paper I give an example of the kind of misconceptions to which the traditionalist approach leads and argue that it should be questioned. This leads me, in the third part, to explain why a reassessment of our assumptions concerning periodisation and relevance should lead us to think of analytical philosophy as eminently post-Kantian and, in particular, to include in the study of its history consideration to the development of "logic" at the turn of the nineteenth century.

**Martin Stokhof - University of Amsterdam**  
**What Cost Naturalism?**

We look at the question of comparing theoretical frameworks in linguistics from the vantage point of their commitment to a naturalistic construal of their object of inquiry, based on the assumption that language is a natural kind that can be studied in the manner of the sciences. Naturalism appears to be a shared assumption of various theories, but the question is how intrinsic the relation between that commitment and other theoretical and methodological assumptions that make up a framework is, and hence what costs a defence of naturalism brings with it.

We will also speculate on the roots of the attractiveness of naturalism, in particular on the role that (methodological) individualism plays there, and ask to what extent different traditions may be more or less committed to a naturalistic construal of language and meaning.

[The research reported is based on joint work with Michiel van Lamblagen.]

**Wang Lu - Tsinghua University**  
**Frege for China**

I will first introduce the general research about Frege in China, including both the translation of his works and some views about his logic and philosophy. I will then talk

about a sentence schema based on Frege, by which one can both interpret Frege's ideas and deal with the issues in philosophy of language in general. The sentence schema given in my talk provides an approach to the analysis of language that is based on Frege. It shows that the language is different from what it expresses. A sentence is a basic unit of linguistic expression and what it corresponds to is a thought on the one hand and a truth-value on the other. A sentence is a whole with component parts, so that, being the reference of a sentence, the true value relies on the references of its components. A sentence has a sense, that is, what it usually expresses. This level, though different from that of reference, is also helpful for determine the truth-value of a sentence, especially when we are dealing with intensional contexts. Taking the discussion of proper names of Frege, Kripke and others as an example, I will show how the sentence schema helps to understand their ideas, to analyse their differences, and to point out the reasons behind their debates.

**Yu Junwei - Renmin University**

### **Modality from the Perspective of Conception**

Although possible world semantics which defines  $p$ 's being necessary as  $p$ 's truth in every accessible possible worlds is very intuitive and transplantable, leading to the great success of modal logic, all these advantages block other views towards modality. We hold that possible world semantics looks outwards and characterizes modality using imagination informally speaking, or accessibility formally speaking, which misses one of the points of modality. It is nearly impossible for us to grasp the essence of modality in philosophical sense when we stand on the level of modal propositional logic. We suppose that modality is concerned about conception. Frege's remarks teach us a lot. From the perspective of conception modal predicate logic is not so unacceptable as thought by Quine. We don't need resort to essentialism.